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April 1994 was a time of liberation and desperation in Africa. While Rwanda degenerated into 
genocidal slaughter, millions of South Africans celebrated freedom as they elected a democratic 
government to end apartheid. Ten years later, as the world quietly memorialized the ten year 
anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, South Africans launched a month-long celebration to 
commemorate ten years of democracy. The highlight of the celebration was the staging of the 
country's third democratic national and provincial elections on 14 April, followed by the 
inauguration of the president on 27 April, Freedom Day, in a 90-million Rand fete at the Union 
buildings in Pretoria.[2] Once again, the continent witnessed two extremes in the month of April: 
reflection and contemplation in Rwanda, contrasted against exuberant celebration in South Africa.  
The outcome of these elections was never in doubt: all knew that the ruling African National 
Congress (ANC) would retain its position and remain the head of government. The questions on 
the minds of South Africans were how great would be the ANC's margin of victory and whether 
the opposition parties would fragment or coalesce around a few, allied parties. By the evening of 
15 April, the answer to these questions became apparent: the ANC was heading to win over two-
thirds of the votes cast, while the opposition remained as fragmented as it had become in the 
1999 elections. In the end, the ANC won 279 out of 400 seats in the lower house of Parliament 
(the National Assembly - NA), and the power to form the government in all nine provincial 
governments. The opposition did not band together behind a few large parties and returned to 
parliament with thirteen parties sharing just 121 seats. The former ruling party, the National Party 
(now the New National Party, or NNP), experienced a devastating defeat as it saw its national 
support decline to less than two percent, winning seats in only two of the provincial legislatures. 
What were the major events in the electoral process, how did various parties fare, and what do 
the results of these elections mean for the future of South Africa? How should we interpret the 
increasingly dominant position of the ANC, and the escalating fragmentation of the opposition? 
What comes next? As South Africa enters its second decade of democracy, this article represents 
a preliminary assessment of the 2004 electoral results, tracing major trends since 1994.  
Administering Elections 
The 1994 elections exhibited a duality common to political transitions: the period was filled with 
the spirit of hope and renewal, but within a climate of insecurity and political intimidation. 
Politically-related violence spiked the year before the elections, with a large number of political 
assassinations, internecine violence between supporters of rival political parties, and fears that 
the White Right or Inkatha would destabilize the electoral process. Violence monitors estimated 
that before the April polls, hundreds of people died each month in politically-related violence, with 
the highest number of incidents occurring in KwaZulu and Natal (areas now combined in the 
KwaZulu-Natal province, KZN), between members of the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP). In other instances, monitors were worried that members of the White Right would stage a 
violent incident capable of derailing the electoral process. In the end, the elections took place 
without major incident, but the process was on a knife's edge. 
In 1999 there were still incidents of violence and intimidation, but on a much smaller scale. KZN 
remained a hotspot, but whereas in the six months preceding the 1994 poll, over 300 people died 
each month, in 1999, in the entire five months before the elections, just under 300 people were 
killed.[3] Other hotspots included areas where a new party, the United Democratic Movement 
(UDM), was strong and posed a challenge to the ruling ANC, such as in the Cape Flats outside of 
Cape Town, the Richmond area of KZN, and certain townships outside of Johannesburg. The 
White Right, which had threatened to derail the poll in 1994, remained passive. The relative calm 
was a sign that as the transition progressed, politics were beginning to normalize. 
By April 2004, the electoral process had become so routine that many hailed the campaign and 
election day as boring, and reporters, notorious for their penchant to search for controversial 
stories, had little to cover. There was no large-scale political intimidation, the number of politically-
related deaths was minimal, and there were very few "hotspots" of conflict between rival parties. 
The list of potential trouble areas identified by the Independent Electoral Committee included, for 
the most part, informal settlements (i.e., shack areas) where fires had destroyed people's identity 
documents, potentially preventing them from voting. The IEC worried that these people would try 
to vote anyway and could get violent when denied.[4] There were reports of intimidation in KZN 
and a few areas but the campaign and election day were overwhelmingly peaceful. The process 
was perceived to be on track to such an extent that the European Union, United Nations, 
Commonwealth and Carter Center all declined to send observer and monitor delegations to 
observe the 2004 polls. 
In fact, by 2004 politics had become so routine that political leaders and analysts worried not 
about voter intimidation but about voter apathy. In 1994 all South Africans over the age of 18 
could vote, but the 1996 constitution required that all subsequent elections be run with a voters' 
roll. Unlike many European countries, in South Africa the responsibility of registering to vote lies 
with the individual, who must first possess a specific form of identification (an official, bar-coded 
identity book) and then apply to be included on the voters' roll by registering at a local office of the 
Department of Home Affairs. While South Africans could register to vote at any Home Affairs 
office at any time up until the election was called, most people either did not know about or were 
unable to take advantage of this opportunity. Therefore, as it had done in 1999, the IEC held 
special "registration weekends," during which local voting stations opened for the purpose of 
registering eligible voters and allowing those already registered to check the existing voters' roll to 
make sure that they were listed. Originally the IEC planned to hold only one registration weekend 
for the 2004 elections but during the initial weekend in September 2003, so few potential voters 
registered that the IEC resorted to holding two more weekends: one in November and one in 
January 2004.[5] After all three weekends, 75% of the eligible voters (i.e., those over the age of 
18, with figures drawn from the 2001 census) had registered to vote, a five percent decline since 
1999. 
Table 1: Registration and Voting Statistics [6] 
 As demonstrated in the above table, both registration and turnout have been steadily decreasing 
over the past three elections. Participation in the national elections has decreased by 30% 
between 1994 and 2004 (evaluated as a percentage of voting age population, VAP). The figures 
are not so low as to jeopardize the quality of South African democracy, yet, but they do show a 
drop off in participation. South Africa is beginning to exhibit rates of participation parallel to other 
institutionalized democracies.[7]  
The decline in registered voters between 1999 and 2004 reflects a variety of factors, including 
confusion about the registration process, inability to get to a registration point, lack of the proper 
identity document, and simple disinterest.[8] Analyzing the factors underlying this decrease has 
become a heated debate among South African analysts, assuming political overtones. On the 
one hand, supporters of the ANC claim that "apathy" is not a problem and represents the 
normalization of the democratic process. On the other hand, critics of the ANC's predominant 
position argue that the decline in registration and turnout are symptoms of a system in which 
people do not think that their vote will make a difference, and therefore are less inclined to bother 
to register and to vote. Thus whether apathy is simply part of the normalization process, or 
whether it is a symptom of declining democracy, underlies the debate among South Africans.  
In most instances, one cannot claim that the decline in turnout in 2004 was due to political 
intimidation or a poorly organized electoral event. On the morning of 14 April, most voting stations 
opened on time, and most closed on schedule. Stations at which there were still lines at closing 
time allowed all people in the queue to cast ballots, as the presiding officer at each polling place 
could make the decision to extend voting hours to midnight, rather than closing at the official time 
of nine pm. The voting process proceeded smoothly, with few of the impediments that had been 
experienced in previous elections (these included lack of ballot papers, long lines, inadequately 
trained staff, wrong sections of the voters rolls).[9] Unlike 1994 and 1999, there were relatively 
few incidents of overcrowded polling stations at which people had to wait the entire day to vote. 
Overall, the process was judged free and fair, with only a few objections about irregularities and 
intimidation lodged with the IEC.  
The biggest problem encountered on election day pertained to difficulties projecting how many 
voters were likely to turn up at each station, because South Africans were allowed to cast ballots 
at any station in the country, provided that they had their bar-coded identity documents with proof 
that they had registered to vote.[10] This provision created a significant organizational difficulty: 
since the elections were held right after the Easter holiday weekend, many South Africans took 
advantage of the public holiday on the election day to extend their vacations and vote outside 
their home stations. This made planning for bottlenecks difficult.[11] To help counteract long wait 
times, several parties organized transportation to move people from crowded to less busy voting 
stations, as had happened in 1994. Nevertheless, the cumulative effect of enabling voters to cast 
ballots at any station, while increasing the ability of people to participate in the electoral process, 
made it difficult for the IEC to anticipate how many voters would arrive at specific stations. Finally, 
complicating the matter further, reports came in that election officials in many stations were at 
times unclear on how to process voters who were trying to cast ballots outside their stations, and 
occasionally turned people away from stations at which they were not registered. 
This administrative difficulty, however, was the only major obstacle on election day. Ten years 
into a democratic South Africa, this represents a remarkable achievement. Similarly, the fact that 
the major worries of political leaders and analysts was about potential apathy, rather than 
electoral violence, signifies the politics are becoming increasingly routine, a sign of the 
institutionalization of democracy in South Africa. Whether this desensitization to politics holds 
positive or negative implications for the quality of democracy in South Africa is a topic that will be 
discussed at the end of the paper. Here, what is important is that, given the high rates of electoral 
fraud and voter intimidation elsewhere in Africa, the often tense situation surrounding elections, 
and South Africa's particular history with political violence and intimidation, it is significant and 
positive that we can discuss the electoral process in terms of "normal" politics should not be 
underestimated. The longer-term effects of such a decline in participation have yet to be seen. 
Electoral Outomes, 1994-2004 
While the normalization of the electoral process in South Africa can be attributed to the 
institutionalization of democratic politics, a large part of the reason also lies in the dominance of 
the ruling party. In a context where the ANC and everyone else knows that the party will win at 
least a majority, if not a super-majority (two-thirds of the vote) of the national ballot, the ruling 
party has little need to intimidate supporters of other parties or meddle with ballot boxes. In fact, 
that the few remaining incidents of electoral violence and intimidation tend to occur with highest 
frequency in the provinces over which the ANC does not hold a majority of the vote, the Western 
Cape and KZN, and in the Eastern Cape, where the UDM challenges the ANC's hold in certain 
rural areas. Thus, the ANC's security in its dominant position can be interpreted as one of the 
factors underlying the increasing peacefulness of the electoral process. 
The electoral dominance of the ANC has been increasing steadily since 1994 (Table 1). The 2004 
elections will be remembered most for the fact that the ANC secured its "Parliament of Hope," 
winning over two-thirds of the seats in the NA and control over all provincial legislatures.[12] The 
ANC increased its share of the national vote from 63% in 1994 to 67% in 2004, while winning a 
plurality of the votes in all nine provinces, and a majority of the ballots in seven (the Western 
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal were the exceptions). The ANC has formed the government in all the 
provincial legislatures and announced the premiers within the week of the elections. 
In contrast to the ANC's consolidating hold on the electorate, the opposition share of the vote has 
declined since 1994. Yet, whether or not the opposition is becoming more fragmented depends 
on the timeframe that one considered. The largest increase in the number of represented 
opposition parties occurred between 1994 and 1999, and there has been a slight concentration of 
the opposition vote behind the largest opposition party between 1999 and 2004 (though in a 
smaller number of votes overall). Since 1994, the number of opposition parties represented in the 
NA has doubled. Many opposition parties that previously earned seats in most provincial 
legislatures now win seats in just a few (Table 3) and the ANC's share of the seats in several 
provincial legislatures has increased. 
As a bloc, the opposition has been unable to maintain its share of the vote, so that the largest 
opposition party in Parliament in 2004 (DA, with 50 seats) has over one-third fewer seats than the 
largest opposition party held in 1994 (the NP, which held 82 seats). The share of the vote held by 
opposition parties, 30.3%, is now distributed among 20 parties contesting the election, and 13 of 
these gained entrance into parliament, up from just 6 opposition parties in 1994 (and 12 in 1999). 
At the same time, however, the largest opposition party in Parliament has gotten larger, in terms 
of absolute number of votes, seats, and share of the poll, since 1999 (although still much smaller 
than the equivalent party in 1994). The "leader of the opposition" following the 2004 poll, the DA, 
holds 12.3% of the vote (50 seats), while in 1999 the largest opposition party (the Democratic 
Party, the predecessor of the DA), held less than 10% of the vote, and just 38 seats.  
Other trends among the opposition saw the NNP decimated: its share of the national poll reduced 
to just 1.7%, down from 6.9% in 1999 and 20.6% in 1994. The party that dominated electoral 
contests for fifty years is now represented in only two provincial legislatures. The UDM increased 
its position to fourth in the NA, despite losing more than half of its members of parliament during a 
period of floor crossing in late 2003, which weakened the party's ability to wage an election 
campaign. The Independent Democrats, in existence for less than a year, broke into the national 
political arena with a larger vote share than the NNP.  
Table 2: National Results, 1994-2004 [13] 
 
Table 3: Provincial Seats Won, 2004 
 
Interpreting Electoral Trends 
There are many ways to interpret these electoral trends. The first point that should be mentioned 
is that the ANC's increased share of the vote must be considered against declining registration 
and turnout. These declines have occurred in a context of an increasing population, raising the 
absolute numbers of both eligible and registered voters (this is increase is especially important 
since the 2004 figures are based on the 2001 census, which more accurately captured African 
and township dwellers than had the 1996 census, on which the 1999 registration figures were 
based). There were five million new voters (VAP) and over two million more registered to vote in 
2004 than in 1999, yet the ANC only increased its absolute number of votes by 276,921 ballots. 
What this means is that the party won a larger share of the poll, but this should be interpreted as 
a decrease in "real" terms: if turnout had increased proportionate with the increase in population, 
the overall number of ballots cast would have been much larger. Therefore, the ANC's 70% could 
very well be an artifact of turnout. 
Second, interpreting the results immediately raises the question of how we should understand the 
electoral dominance and centralization of power within the ANC. The debate on the ANC as a 
dominant party overlooks one very important aspect of the phenomenon: becoming a dominant 
party was not an automatic process, and retaining that position has required effort. The ANC has 
worked very hard to retain its position as the leading party in South Africa and to prevent the 
organization from following in the footsteps of the many liberation movements throughout Africa 
that fractured soon after independence in the 1960s and 1970s. The mid-1990s were an arduous 
time for the ANC as the liberation movement reworked itself into a functioning political party and 
began the transformation of South African government and society. The party, which had been 
forced by the demands of the struggle to operate in exile since 1960, had a tradition of top-down, 
hierarchical control that enforced strict party discipline. In contrast, within South Africa the United 
Democratic Front (UDF), an umbrella body of grassroots organizations that were loosely aligned 
with the ANC, waged the struggle against apartheid on the inside. The UDF, in contrast to the 
ANC in exile, governed itself through a through a system of consultation and discussion, as the 
numerous sub-units retained their autonomy while working together for the struggle. After the 
National Party un-banned the ANC in 1990, the two organizations began to merge, a process of 
integration that has created many internal challenges for the party. 
At the same time as it faced these internal challenges, the ANC had to take over a government 
that had been designed to oppress the majority, and to turn it into an organization capable of 
development, uplift-ment, and empowerment. On the governing front, the ruling party had to 
transform the apartheid bureaucracy into a civil service that would transform and uplift, to learn 
how to govern a massive country of forty-two million people, to manage the conflicting demands 
of a modern, industrial economy that sits side-by-side with traditional, small-scale farming; to 
confront problems of endemic poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment, and poor education. 
The demands were many and varied, and the party faced them with varying success. Internally, 
the party had to reconcile the different traditions of the ANC and the UDF while protecting against 
fragmentation and to retain the unity between South Africans from various backgrounds that was 
created during the struggle.  
The ANC never took its position as a dominant party for granted. Instead, from 1994 through 
2004, the ANC strategically used its position to influence the creation of political institutions and 
national legislation that provided the party with mechanisms with which it could insulate itself from 
centripetal pressures, such as a party-list proportional-representation electoral system and an 
extremely centralized federal system, focusing all lines of power and accountability upwards to 
the national leadership. In the latest example of this centralization, the ANC refused to nominate 
candidates for the provincial premierships prior to the 2004 elections, instead nominating people 
to be "deployed" as the premiers three days after the elections. This tactic both defused 
factionalization within the provinces, while also reinforcing the party's control over its members.  
The ruling party has also pursued less formal mechanisms to preserve its status, such as 
maintaining the strategic alliance with the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). This alliance enables the ANC to internalize 
(and co-opt) criticism from the left and provides the party with the ideological flexibility to curtail 
the organizational ground for opposition parties. Finally, the ANC has manipulated its dominant 
position to intentionally organize political discourse to demonize the opposition as racist and 
reinforces one social cleavage, that between blacks and whites, into a political white-black 
opposition that has prevented the successful politicization of competing lines of division, be these 
based on interest groups, ethnic identities, or class. On top of all these long-term strategies, the 
party runs a formidable election machine that brings disaffected supporters back to the party at 
election time.[14]  
The electoral performance of the ANC, its continued dominance and its behavior in government 
must be interpreted against all these factors. The tendency to centralize power in the presidency, 
to strictly enforce party discipline, and to crack down on public dissent outside of party structures 
are all defensive mechanisms to keep the party together. The ANC has felt that this unity was 
necessary to begin and manage the transformation of South African society. Similarly, the ANC 
views its dominant position as enabling it to lead the transformation without derailment. 
Yet, the party's tendencies toward intolerance of public criticism and centralization of power are 
worrisome from the perspective of increasing democratic accountability, responsiveness, and 
transparency. When one party controls so much of the National Assembly, the most important 
debates take place within the caucus of the ruling party. If, then, the ruling party exhibits signs of 
intolerance of dissent and centralization of power, when it muffles vibrant debate, this become 
worrying to those concerned with the continued democratic development of South Africa.  
Third, the opposition to date has barely presented itself as a viable alternative to the ANC, as a 
group of parties with leadership and policy platforms that are attractive to a wide variety of South 
Africans. The opposition's continuing inability to present itself as a viable, credible and genuine 
alternative to the ANC remains a major trend in South African electoral politics. The decline of the 
NNP seems, to most, to be the inevitable conclusion for the party that created the apartheid 
system. In 1994, the NP emerged from the elections as the second largest party in parliament, 
with representation in all nine provincial legislatures. The "New" NP was reduced to third largest 
national party in 1999, with its support base concentrated primarily in the Western and Northern 
Cape provinces. It retained members in all nine provincial legislatures, seven out of nine 
provinces its held only three or fewer members. The NNP's performance in 2004 proved 
disastrous: the party won seats in just two legislatures (Western Cape and Northern Cape), and 
became the fifth largest party in the NA.  
The NNP's poor performance can be attributed to many factors, but chief among them is the fact 
that it has engaged in so many coalitions and alliances since 1994 that voters can no longer say 
what, if anything, the party stands for. The last straw seems to have been the coalition 
arrangements that the NNP worked out with the ANC in 2001, giving the ANC entrance into the 
Western Cape provincial government. This deal put the NNP back into a close relationship with 
the ruling party, an arrangement that makes it difficult to consider the NNP as a genuine 
"opposition" party. In 1996, the NP had withdrawn from the Government of National Unity 
precisely because of this problem, so it should have been no surprise that it faced similar 
problems in the 2004 campaign. Whether the NNP will last even 5 more years now becomes a 
genuine question, and there have been rumors in the South African press that the NNP is 
considering disbanding.[15]  
The transformation of the Democratic Party from a liberal, English-dominated voice for freedom 
into its current conservative form (the Democratic Alliance) took more analysts by surprise than 
did the decline of the NNP. After the elections in 1994, the DP had seven representatives in the 
National Assembly, and decided that it would operate as a moderating voice in parliament, 
attempting to persuade the much larger parties to adopt DP policy perspectives. This changed by 
1998, however, as the party shifted tactics when beginning to position itself for the 1999 
elections. At this time, the party began to take a much more aggressive stance, becoming a vocal 
opposition party, so much so that party leader Tony Leon earned the moniker, "the chihuahua."  
In its bid to become the largest opposition party, the DP first pursued the NNP's Afrikaner support 
base in its campaign for the 1999 elections, then created an alliance party (the Democratic 
Alliance) with the NNP in June 2000,[16] and following the withdrawal of the NNP from the new 
party in 2001, the DP decided to go forward with the new creation. The DP officially became the 
DA at all levels of government in April 2003. In its current form, the DA's strategy of "aggressive 
opposition" alienates many South Africans, and the party has become perceived by many as a 
conservative protector of minority interests that simply opposes all ANC propositions on principle. 
Even though the party claims that it represents the interests of all South Africans, common 
perceptions differ.[17] Therefore, the party's potential to develop into an alternative party capable 
of mounting a real electoral challenge to the ANC will remain limited, unless the party radically 
changes tacks and recruits a large cohort of black supporters, not just at the mass level, but also 
in leadership. The DA made small inroads into the black electorate in the 2004 elections, but has 
yet to break through to significant support levels. The DA has yet to genuinely transform its 
leadership to include a majority of black, colored and Indian leaders. At present, most of its 
leaders are white, and those who are not have histories from the struggle era that render them 
suspect amongst many South Africans. Until the party's national leadership changes, the DA is 
bound to remain perceived by many South Africans as a representative of minority (interpreted as 
white), interests.  
The IFP emerged from the 2004 elections as the third largest party in the NA, holding same rank 
as in 1994 and 1999. The IFP's bid to increase its performance in the provinces in 1999 had 
failed, and after the 2004 elections its presence outside KZN declined even further. The big 
changes for the IFP after this election were that the party lost control over the KZN provincial 
legislature, and failed to secure ministerial position in the new Cabinet. Both of these are highly 
significant for the party, as KZN is the IFP's stronghold and the party previously retained national 
relevance by serving in the cabinet. Now, the only IFP representative in the cabinet is the Rev. 
Musa Zondi, the IFP's national spokesperson, appointed as the deputy minister of pubic works. 
The ANC gave Buthelezi's portfolio as Minister of Home Affairs, which he had held since 1994, to 
his former deputy minister.[18]  
Equally, if not more significant, for the first time the ANC eclipsed the IFP as the largest party in 
KZN, challenging the party in its sole remaining area of influence. The IFP could not accept this 
fact, and immediately launched a court case to protest the certification of electoral results, 
claiming that it had launched complaints with the IEC about the conduct poll in forty-seven 
electoral districts. The party argued that approximately 367,000 votes in KZN had been tampered 
with, exactly enough to overturn the ANC's plurality in the provincial poll. A week later, in the 
"interests of national unity," the IFP dropped the court case, on the same day as Zondi was 
nominated to serve in the cabinet. Overall, the IFP emerged from the 2004 as a much reduced 
political force, with a tenuous position in its traditional stronghold, and needing to resort to 
tantrum tactics to retain influence in the national scene. 
Small parties that broke into the national political scene in 1999, such as the United Democratic 
Movement (UDM), had briefly raised the possibility that a non-racial (or multi-racial) opposition 
party had finally arrived. Yet in 2004, the UDM performed very poorly, and has been reduced to a 
primarily black, Eastern-Cape based, organization. The one sign of hope in the elections was the 
rise of the Independent Democrats (ID), a political party formed in April 2003, which just one year 
after its formation earned a number of votes equal to the NNP. Led by fiery politician and ex-Pan 
Africanist Congress member Patricia de Lille, this party has the potential to become a multi-racial 
voice for the poor, if it can build an organization that does not sustain itself solely through the 
charisma of its leader, de Lille. Christian parties, such as the African Christian Democratic Party 
(ACDP), though representing a small percentage of the overall vote, continue to perform relatively 
well among the opposition. The ACDP has consistently increased its vote share since 1994.  
Underlying all these trends is the decline in voter turnout. At this point, one can only speculate as 
to which categories of eligible voters declined to exercise their rights. The decreased share of the 
vote earned by the opposition parties would suggest that it is their voters who stayed home. At 
the same time, the fact that the ANC's absolute votes increased by only 270,000 also indicates 
that while the ANC prevented many in its traditional support base from voting elsewhere, it also 
did not motivate a large number of its potential supporters to actually go to the polls.  
For the time being, politics in South Africa is stable and democracy is sinking deep roots. There 
are worrying signs of party dominance, which could be creating voter apathy, but the country's 
rates of participation are not unusually low when compared against other countries in similar 
situations. The increasing centralization and dominance of the ANC remains a concern from the 
standpoint of democratic transparency, but at the same time this dominance has increased 
political stability in post-apartheid South Africa. Similarly, the continuing "irrelevance" of the 
opposition may become a threat to democratic stability, for as voters de-align from the ANC, if 
they do not find an alternative political home through which to express their political aspirations, 
the party system could become divorced from the realities of political life. In a system run on 
party-list proportional representation, this disconnect could ultimately prove destabilizing.  
But such pessimism is not yet warranted. The 2004 elections did not represent a break with 
trends that were established between 1994 and 1999. The election process and results 
demonstrated that politics are normalizing in South Africa, while at the same time pointing to 
areas that need to be monitored. For now, democracy is stable, institutionalizing itself and 
performing well. If the country can avoid the pitfalls of permanent party dominance and the slow 
erosion of democratic freedoms (as occurred in neighboring Zimbabwe after 1980), the second 
ten years of democracy will be worth celebrating. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
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